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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PPL MONTANA CASE:
EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NAVIGABILITY
AND STATE OWNERSHIP OF SUBMERGED LANDS
RICHARD C. A USNESS*
The United States Supreme Court held in PPL Montana v. Montana
held that the State of Montana did not own the beds beneath certain
rivers and, therefore, rejected the State's claim that the power company
owed it millions of dollars in "back rent" for the use of the riverbeds as
sites for ten of its hydroelectric power plants. The Montana Supreme
Court, which had ruled in favor of the State, declared that even if
portions of a river were not navigable for commercial purposes because
of physical conditions, the entire river would be treated as navigable if
commercial traffic could bypass the non-navigable segments by
utilizing land routes instead. On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected
this approach to navigability, distinguishing between the tests of
navigability that were traditionally used to determine federal regulatory
jurisdiction in admiralty and commerce clause cases, and the test of
navigability that had should be used to determine title to submerged
lands under the equal footing doctrine. This Article discusses the
concept of navigability and its use as a means of determining the
ownership of tidelands and the beds of rivers, lakes and streams. It also
examines the PPL Montana case and concludes that the Court was
correct to reaffirm its traditional segment-by-segment test under which
ownership of beds beneath non-navigable portions of a river would not
be transferred to a state upon its admission to the Union.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Last February, the United States Supreme Court decided PPL
Montana v. Montana, I unanimously reversing a decision by the
Montana Supreme Court that had held that certain segments of the
Missouri, Madison, and Clark Fork rivers in Montana were navigable.2
The Supreme Court also declared that the State of Montana did not own
the beds beneath these rivers and therefore rejected Montana's claim
that the PPL Montana power company owed the State millions of dollars
in "back rent" for the use of the riverbeds as sites for some of its
hydroelectric power plants.3
The Montana Supreme Court had declared that a river would be
regarded as navigable for title purposes if it was susceptible of serving
as "a channel for commerce." 4 Under this approach, even if portions of
a river were not navigable for commercial purposes because of physical
conditions, the entire river would be treated as navigable if commercial
traffic could bypass the non-navigable segments by utilizing land routes
instead.' Under this reasoning, the court held that Montana acquired
title to the beds beneath both the navigable and the non-navigable
segments of the rivers at the time of statehood.6
On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected this approach to navigability,
distinguishing tests of navigability that were traditionally used to
determine federal regulatory authority from the test that had been used
to determine title to submerged lands under the equal footing doctrine.7
The Court stated that the test employed by the Montana court was well-
suited for determining the scope of federal regulatory power, which
could and should adapt to physical and technological changes, but such
1 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012).
2 Id. at 1235.
3 Id.
4 See PPL Montana v. Montana, 229 P.3d 421, 446 (Mont. 2010).
5Id.
6 Id. at 449.
7 See PPL Montana, 132 S. Ct. at 1231-32.
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a test was not appropriate for use in title cases.8 Instead, the Court
concluded that navigability, and therefore, title to submerged beds,
should be determined on a tract-by-tract basis.9
This Article will discuss the concept of navigability and its use as a
means of determining who owns tidelands and the beds of rivers, lakes,
and streams. This will involve an examination of the various tests of
navigability, as well as consideration of the equal footing doctrine and
the public trust doctrine. This Article will also analyze the PPL
Montana case and evaluate the Court's reasoning.
Part II covers the equal footing doctrine and the public trust doctrine.
Both of these principles played an important role in the PPL Montana
decision. The equal footing doctrine dictates that newly admitted states
are admitted to the Union with the same rights and powers as the
original thirteen states. '0 Since the original states succeeded to the
English Crown's title to the tidelands and the beds beneath other
navigable waters, other states would also acquire title to submerged
lands beneath navigable waters when they achieved statehood. 1' On the
other hand, the equal footing doctrine would not apply to submerged
lands beneath non-navigable waters, which would continue to be owned
by the United States or its successors in interest.' A second concept
known as the public trust doctrine provides that the states hold the
tidelands and the beds beneath freshwater rivers and lakes in trust for
their citizens in order to protect public rights to navigation, fishing, and
recreation.
Part III discusses navigability as the basis for federal regulation under
admiralty law and the Commerce Clause. Admiralty jurisdiction, in
accordance with the English practice, was originally confined to tidal
waters. However, as Part III points out, by the middle of the nineteenth
century, the Court formulated a "navigability-in-fact" test that extended
federal admiralty jurisdiction to all fresh waters that were capable of
serving as channels for foreign or interstate commerce. Several decades
later, the Court adopted a similar approach to define the extent of
federal power under the Commerce Clause.
Part IV sets forth the test of navigability for title purposes. As Part II
discusses, after. the American Revolution, the original thirteen states
obtained title to the tidelands and other submerged lands within their
8 Id. at 1232.
9 Id. at 1230.
1o See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 223 (1845).
I See United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1926); Shively v. Bowlby, 152
U.S. 1, 26 (1894).
12 See Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 591-92 (1922).
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borders.13 Under the equal footing doctrine, when the various territories
attained statehood, they also acquired title to tidelands' 4 and the beds
beneath navigable rivers and lakes. "5 At the same time, submerged
lands beneath non-navigable waters continued to be owned by the
federal government or its successors in interest.'6 The Supreme Court
has traditionally relied on the "navigability-in-fact" test to determine the
navigability of non-tidal waters for title purposes. '7 However, the
version of this test that is used for title purposes differs in some respects
from the version that is used to determine the scope of federal admiralty
or Commerce Clause regulation. Although the river or lake does not
have to actually been used for "trade or travel, 8 under the navigability-
for-title test, it must be susceptible of such use in its natural condition. '9
In addition, the river or lake must be capable of use for commercial
navigation, but not necessarily foreign or interstate commerce. Finally,
title to submerged lands is determined as of the date of statehood and is
not affected by any subsequent changes in the navigable capacity of the
river or lake.2 °
Part V analyzes the PPL Montana case. Affirming a lower court
judgment for the State of Montana, the Montana Supreme Court held
that the waters of the Missouri, Madison, and Clark Fork Rivers were
navigable and, therefore, that the beds of these rivers belonged to the
state.2 ' In reaching this conclusion, the Montana court adopted a test of
navigability-in-fact that resembled the approach employed by the
Supreme Court in admiralty and Commerce Clause regulation cases.
Under this approach, as long as the rivers served as "channels of
commerce," it did not matter if some portions were non-navigable.22
However, the United States Supreme Court rejected this approach and
adopted a segment-by-segment test under which ownership of beds
'3 See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367,416 (1842).
"4 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 484-85 (1988); Mann v. Tacoma
Land Co., 153 U.S. 273, 285 (1894); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894); Pollard v. Hagan,
44 U.S. 212, 222-23 (1845).
15 See Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 12 (1971); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S.
4, 579 (1926); Bamey v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876).
16 See Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 89 (1922); Oklahoma v.
Texas,-258 U.S. 574, 591-92 (1922).
17 See, e.g., United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank,
270 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1926); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 89
(1922).
18 See Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 12 (1-971); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 82
(1931).
19 See United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 (1926).
20 Id. at 57.
21 See PPL Montana, 229 P.3d at 449.
22 Id. at 446.
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beneath non-navigable portions of a river would not be transferred to a
state upon its admission to the Union.23
II. THE EQUAL FOOTING AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES
The law with respect to the ownership of submerged lands is a
complex synthesis of three concepts: navigability, the equal footing
doctrine, and the public trust doctrine. The concept of navigability will
be more thoroughly discussed in Part III. In essence, the state owns the
beds beneath navigable waters while the beds beneath non-navigable
waters may be privately owned. For purposes of determining ownership
of submerged lands, navigable waters include waters that are subject to
the ebb and flow of the tides as well as waters that are capable of
supporting customary forms of commercial activity. The equal footing
doctrine provides that, as a matter of federal constitutional law, new
states take title to the beds beneath navigable waters when they are
admitted to the Union. The public trust doctrine provides that, as a
matter of state law, the state holds title to the submerged lands beneath
navigable waters in trust for the benefit of the public and cannot alienate
these lands except to promote public uses such as navigation and
commerce.
A. The Equal Footing Doctrine
At the end of the Revolutionary War, the thirteen original states
succeeded to the proprietary rights and governmental powers of the
English Crown.24 As such, they assumed ownership of the beds beneath
tidal (and later) navigable fresh waters.25 In the nineteenth century, the
Supreme Court in a series of cases declared that when other states were
subsequently admitted to the Union, they also acquired ownership of
submerged lands beneath tidal and navigable waters within their
borders. 26 This became known as the equal footing doctrine." The
Supreme Court first set forth this principle in Pollard v. Hagan2" in
1845. The plaintiffs in that case sought to eject the defendants from
23 See PPL Montana, 132 S. Ct. at 1235.
24 See Martin v. Wadell, 41 U.S. 367, 416 (1842).
25 Id. at410.
26 See, e.g., United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1926); Brewer-Elliott Oil &
Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 85 (1922); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 583 (1922);
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 183
(1891); Weber v. Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1873).
27 For a further discussion of the equal footing doctrine, see Paul Constable, Equal Footing,
County Supremacy, and the Western Public Lands, 26 ENVTL. L. 1263, 1279-83 (1996).
28 44 U.S. 212 (1845).
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certain -former tidelands in Mobile Bay. 29 The plaintiffs based their
claim to the property on a patent from the federal government that was
authorized by a statute enacted in 1836.30
The Court observed that Alabama was ceded to the United States by
the State of Georgia in 1802. 3" The Georgia deed of cession was almost
identical to a deed executed by Virginia in 1784 which transferred its
territory north of the Ohio River to the United States.32 Both deeds
provided that any states formed out of these territories would have "the
same rights of sovereignty, freedom, and independence as the other
states."33 Thus, the Court declared that "[w]hen Alabama was admitted
to the union on an equal footing with the original states, she succeeded
to all rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction and eminent domain which
Georgia possessed at the date of cession . . . ,34 According to the
Court, when the United States accepted this cession of territory, it
agreed to hold all "public lands" in trust for the benefit of future states
that would be created out of it.35 The Court then considered whether the
federal government had the power to alienate any of these "public
lands" prior to statehood. The Court observed that the purpose of
transferring territory by the original states to the federal government
was to help the federal government pay for debts incurred during the
Revolutionary War and also to eventually create new states out this
territory.36 However, the Court declared that it would be inconsistent
with both the Constitution and the terms of the deeds of cession for the
federal government to sell tidelands within these territories to private
persons.37
The plaintiffs in Pollard argued that the federal government's
ownership of the tidelands beneath Mobile Bay was not based on the
cession from Georgia, but instead derived from the kingdom of Spain.38
According to the plaintiffs, the King of Spain owned these submerged





33 Pollard, 44 U.S. at 22 1.
34 Id. at 223.
35 Id. at 222-23.
36 Id. at 224.
37 Id.
38 Pollard, 44 U.S. at 220. For a discussion of the extensive litigation that occurred over the
validity of Spanish land grants in western Florida, southern Mississippi and Alabama, and eastern
Louisiana between 1820 and 1850, see Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress Before
the Civil War, 97 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1300-15 (2009).
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Lorenzo el Real in 1795. 39 However, the Court concluded that this
treaty merely demarcated the boundaries between the two countries and
did not purport to cede any territory.4" Although Spain did claim some
parts of southern Alabama and Mississippi as part of its colony of West
Florida, the United States never acknowledged this claim and proceeded
to occupy this territory in 1813.' Finally, the Court concluded that a
compact between the United States and Alabama, when that state was
admitted to the Union did not constitute a transfer of state-owned
tidelands to the United States, but instead merely confirmed that the
federal government retained certain regulatory powers over the
navigable waters of the state.42 Therefore, the Court upheld the lower
court's judgment in favor of the defendants.43
The equal footing doctrine was subsequently reaffirmed in Shively v.
Bowlby.44 The case involved a dispute over certain lands in Astoria,
Oregon, located below the high water mark of the Columbia River.45
John Bowlby and W.W. Parker, the plaintiffs in the case, traced their
title to a deed, executed in 1876, from the State of Oregon. 6 The statute
allowed littoral owners to purchase adjacent tidelands in order to make
improvements on them.47 Acting in reliance on their deed from the
state, the plaintiffs built a commercial wharf that extended several
hundred feet to the channel of the Columbia River for the purpose of
receiving and discharging freight from oceangoing ships. 48 The
defendants, John Shively and his wife, derived their title from the
federal government under the Oregon Donation Act of 1850.19 The
defendants contended that they had acquired certain property, including
the tidelands in question, from the federal government in 1854.50 The
Oregon courts held in favor of the plaintiffs." Relying on the reasoning
in Martin v. Wadell,52 the Supreme Court held that states admitted since
the adoption of the Constitution had the same rights as the original
states in the tidelands and the beds beneath navigable waters within
39 Pollard, 44 U.S. at 225-26.
40 Id. at 226.
41 Id. at 227-28.
42 Id. at 229-30.
43 Id. at 230.
- 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
45 Id. at 2.
46 Id. at 3-4.
47 Id. at 55 n.l.
48 Id. at 53.
49 Shively, 152 U.S. at 2.
50 Id. at 2-3.
51 Id. at 9.
52 41 U.S. 367 (1842).
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their territory.53 Furthermore, the Court observed that "the title and
dominion of the tide waters, and the lands under them, are held by the
United States for the benefit of the whole people, and... in trust for the
future states."54 Thus, the Oregon Donation Act did not pass any title to
land below the high water mark." For this reason, the Court affirmed
the judgment of the Oregon Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiffs.5 6
State ownership of the tidelands under the equal footing doctrine was
also implicated in Knight v. United Land Association." The plaintiffs in
that case traced their title to a grant from the State of California, while
the defendant based his title on a grant from Mexico to the pueblo of
San Francisco. 8 The California Supreme Court held in the plaintiffs'
favor. 19 The Supreme Court declared that when the United States
acquired the California territory from Mexico in 1848, it acquired title
to both tidelands and uplands.60 While the federal government's title to
uplands was absolute, it normally held the tidelands in trust for the
future states that would be created from that territory.6 However, when
the United States acquired California from Mexico by treaty, it had
agreed to protect property interests previously granted by the Mexican
and Spanish governments.62 Consequently, the Court reasoned that the
defendants were entitled to prevail if the property in question was
included within the pueblo grant.63 After reviewing some of the prior
litigation involving the pueblo grant, the Court concluded that the
defendant's title was valid and reversed the decision of the California
Supreme Court.64
The equal footing doctrine is not confined to tidelands; it also applies
to the beds beneath navigable fresh waters. For example, in Barney v.
Keokuk,65 a riparian owner sued the City of Keokuk, Iowa, objecting to
the construction of wharves and levees on reclaimed land along the
Mississippi River that had been dedicated to it for street purposes.66
Upholding the right of the City, acting on behalf of the public to
53 Shively, 152 U.S. at 26.
54 Id. at 49 (internal quotations omitted).
55 Id. at 49-50.
56 Id. at 58.
57 142 U.S. 161 (1891).
58 Id. at 162-63.
59 Id. at 189.
60 id. at 183.
61 Id.
62 Knight, 142 U.S. at 183-84.
63 Id. at 184.
64 Id. at 189.
65 94 U.S. 324 (1876).
66 Id. at 336-37.
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promote navigation and commerce on the River, the Court rejected the
argument that navigability, and thus the scope of the equal footing
doctrine, was limited to tidal waters.67 According to the Court, while
Martin v. Waddell and other cases involved tidewaters, these cases
nevertheless set out principles that were also applicable to navigable
fresh waters.68 In the Court's words:
Since this [C]ourt ... has declared that the Great Lakes and
other navigable waters of the country, above as below the flow
of the tide, are, in the strictest sense, entitled to the
denomination of navigable waters, and amendable to the
admiralty jurisdiction, there seems no sound reason for adhering
to the old rule as to the proprietorship of the beds and shores of
such waters. It properly belongs to the States by their inherent
sovereignty, and the United States has wisely abstained from
extending (if it could extend) its survey and grants beyond the
limits of high water.69
The Court concluded by holding that any title to land below the original
ordinary high water mark that the riparian owner might claim by virtue
of the City's reclamation efforts was nothing more than "a bare legal
title, subject to the public easement and use, not only for street
purposes, but for the purposes of wharves, landings, and levees.""
Although the federal government normally holds the beds beneath
navigable waters in trust for future states prior to statehood, Congress
may convey them into private ownership in response to "some
international duty or public exigency."'" However, when deciding
whether or not such a conveyance has been made, a court must begin
with a strong presumption against the conveyance of sovereignty
submerged lands.72 Montana v. United States73 illustrates the strength of
this presumption. In that case, the United States sought to quiet title to
the bed of the navigable Big Horn River in Montana.74 The submerged
lands in question were located within boundaries of the Crow Tribe
Reservation.75 The Crow Tribe wished to prohibit non-members of the
Tribe from fishing and duck hunting in the river.76 The plaintiffs
maintained that the United States conveyed the bed of the Big Horn
67 Id. at 337-38.
68 Id. at 338.
69 Id.
70 Barney, 94 U.S. at 339-40.
71 See Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 55.
72 See United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. I, 14 (1935).
73 450 U.S. 544(1981).
74 Id. at 546.
75 Id. at 547.
76 Id.
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River to the Crow Tribe when it established the Reservation by treaty
prior to Montana's admission to the Union.77 The State of Montana
contended that the river was navigable and the submerged lands beneath
it passed to Montana when it achieved statehood.78 On appeal, the
Court agreed that title to the bed of the Big Horn River passed to
Montana when it became a state. 9
The Supreme Court acknowledged that Congress could transfer
submerged lands beneath navigable waters prior to statehood "in order
to perform international obligations, or to effect the improvement of
such lands for the promotion and convenience of commerce with
foreign nations and among the several States, or to carry out other
public purposes appropriate to the objects for which the United States
hold the Territory."8  Nevertheless, the Court concluded that even
though the establishment of an Indian Reservation could be considered
an "appropriate public purpose," justifying the congressional
conveyance of a riverbed, no "public exigency" existed at the time
which would have required Congress to depart from its longstanding
policy of reserving the beds beneath navigable waters for the benefit of
future states.'
Although the presumption invoked by the Court in Montana v.
United States is a strong one, it has been overcome in some cases, as
illustrated by Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma.82 The controversy in
Choctaw Nation arose when the State of Oklahoma leased a portion of
the bed of the Arkansas River for oil and gas exploration. 83 The
Cherokee Nation claimed ownership of the riverbed and sued to recover
royalties obtained from the leases.84 Later, the Choctaw and Chickasaw
Nations made similar claims to those portions of the bed of the
Arkansas River that lay within their Reservations.85 The district court
held in favor of Oklahoma, and this decision was affirmed by a federal
appeals court.8 6
All of the parties agreed that the Arkansas River was navigable below
its juncture with the Grand River. 87 However, the Cherokee and
Choctaw Tribes argued that the United States had conveyed the riverbed
77 Id. at 550-5 1.
78 Montana, 450 U.S. at 55 1.
79 Id. at 556-57.
80 Id. at 551 (quoting Shively, 152 U.S. at 48).
81 Id. at 556.
82 397 U.S. 620 (1970).
83 Id. at 62 1.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 621-22.
86 See Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 402 F.2d 739, 748 (10th Cir. 1968).
87 Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 633.
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to them by a series of treaties during the nineteenth century. 8 8 The
Court began its discussion of the case with a review of these treaties,
focusing on the 1830 Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek between the
United States and the Choctaws and the 1835 Treaty of New Echota
with the Cherokees. 9 Both treaties conveyed a large part of Oklahoma
to these Indian tribes. 90 The treaties provided metes and bounds
descriptions of the territory being transferred and made no mention of
the portion of the Arkansas River that ran through the Indian land.9'
The Court invoked a rule of construction that favored the Indian
claims. According to the Court:
The Indian Nations did not seek out the United States and agree
upon an exchange of lands in an arm's-length transaction.
Rather, treaties were imposed upon them and they had no choice
but to consent. As a consequence, this Court has often held that
treaties with the Indians must be interpreted as they would have
understood them ... and any doubtful expressions in them
should be resolved in the Indians' favor.92
Applying this rule of construction, the Court concluded that the entire
Arkansas River below its confluence with the Grand River was within
the territory conveyed to the Cherokee and Choctaw Nations by the
1830 and 1835 treaties, 93 thereby reversing the decisions of the lower
courts .9 4
However, in a more recent decision, Utah v. United States,95 the
Court upheld the applicability of the equal footing doctrine. The case
involved a dispute between the United States and the State of Utah over
the ownership of certain submerged lands beneath Utah Lake. 96 Utah
brought suit to quiet title and to enjoin the United States from entering
into oil and gas leases for lands beneath the lake.97 The federal district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the United States98 and the
circuit court affirmed. 99
Utah Lake, a 150 square mile freshwater lake located about thirty
miles south of Salt Lake City, drained into the Jordan River and then
88 Id. at 626-30.
89 Id. at 626.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 628-30.
92 Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 630-31.
93 Id. at 635.
94 Id. at 636.
95 482 U.S. 193 (1987).
96 Id. at 195.
97 Id. at 200.
98 See Utah v. United States, 624 F. Supp. 622, 629 (D. Utah 1983).
99 See Utah v. United States, 780 F.2d 1515, 1525 (10th Cir. 1985).
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flowed northward into the Great Salt Lake.' ° It was undisputed that
Utah Lake was navigable; however, the parties disagreed about the
effect of a "reservation" of the lakebed and some of the land around it
by the federal government prior to statehood.' In 1888, Congress
enacted a law that authorized the United States Geological Survey
("USGS") to select potential sites for reservoirs to be used for purposes
of irrigation and flood control.0 2 The Act also provided that the federal
government would withdraw these sites from purchase by settlers.' 3 In
1889, the USGS designated Utah Lake and a two-mile area around the
lake as a potential reservoir site. 'o' Although the 1888 statute was
repealed two years later, 05 the 1890 legislation preserved reservations
made by the USGS under the earlier Act. 06
The issue before the Court on appeal was whether Congress could
defeat the rights of a future state prior to statehood by "reserving" the
beds beneath navigable waters to itself for future federal projects or
whether Congress could only override the equal footing doctrine by
conveying these submerged lands to a third party.0 7 Relying on the
reasoning of Shively v. Bowlby, °8 the Court concluded that the Property
Clause gave Congress the power to acquire land within a territory to
implement other powers conferred on it by the Constitution.' 9 At the
same time, the Court acknowledged that it would not "infer that
[C]ongress intended to defeat a future State's title to land under
navigable waters 'unless the intention was definitely declared or
otherwise made very plain.""" Although a congressional intent to
defeat state rights could be clearly shown by a conveyance of
submerged lands to a third party, the Court refused to infer such intent
from a reservation alone."'
Turning to the facts of the case, the Court observed that the purpose
of the USGS's reservation of the area around the lake was not intended
to affect the future state of Utah's ownership of the lake bed; rather, it
was merely intended to restrict settlement on the upland areas around
100 See Utah v. United States, 780 U.S. 193, 198 (1987).
101 Id. at 198-99.
102 Sundry Appropriations Act of Oct. 2, 1.888, ch. 1069, 25 Stat. 505, 526 (repealed 1890).
103 Utah v. United States, 482 U.S. at 198-99.
104 Id. at 199.
105 Sundry Appropriations Act of Aug. 30, 1890, ch. 837, 26 Stat. 371 (1890).
106 Utah v. United States, 482 U.S. at 199.
107 Id. at 200-01.
los 152 U.S. 1, 48 (1894).
109 See Utah v. United States, 482 U.S. at 201.
1O Id, at 201-02 (quoting Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 55).
Id. at 202.
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the lake so that the lake could be used as a future reservoir site." 2 The
practice of "segregating" certain portions of the public domain from sale
around Utah Lake dated back as far as 1856 and provided no evidence
of a congressional intent to defeat the future state's rights under the
equal footing doctrine." 3 Consequently, the Court held that title to the
bed of Utah Lake passed to Utah in 1896 when it was admitted to the
Union." 4
Finally, it is interesting to note that the equal footing doctrine can
sometimes work against the interests of a state rather than in its favor.
United States v. Texas" 5 illustrates this principle. This case involved a
dispute between the United States and Texas over certain submerged
lands along the Texas coast. 116 These lands were located below the
ordinary low water mark and extended three marine leagues into the
Gulf of Mexico.' '" Much of the land had been leased to oil companies
and both parties claimed the revenues from these leases.' 8 The parties
agreed that the United States and other countries recognized the three-
league boundary that Texas claimed between 1836 and 1845 while it
was an independent nation. "9 Texas argued that it retained its former
international boundary when it was admitted to the Union.'20 The Court
concluded that the equal footing doctrine prohibited Texas from
retaining rights in the marginal sea that other states did not have.'2 '
The Court began by declaring that the equal footing doctrine was
concerned with ensuring that all of the states had equal political rights
and sovereignty.'22 Furthermore, the Court pointed out that ownership
of the beds of navigable waters within a state was closely connected
with its sovereign powers of government and, therefore, title to these
beds ordinarily passed to states upon their admission to the Union. 12 3
According to the Court:
For that reason, upon the admission of a state to the Union, the
title of the United States to lands underlying navigable waters
within the state passes to it, as incident to the transfer to the
112 Id. at 206.
113 Id.
114 Utah v. United States, 482 U.S. at 209.
1'5 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
116 Id. at 709.
117 Id. at 711. One marine league is 3.45 English statute miles. Id. at 714 n.5. Thus, three
marine leagues would be equal to 10.35 English statute miles.
''8 Id. at 709.
119 Id. at 711.
120 United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. at 711.
121 Id. at715.
122 1d. at716.
123 Id. at 717.
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state of local sovereignty, and is subject only to the paramount
power of the United States to control such waters for purposes
of navigation in interstate and foreign commerce. 124
At the same time, the Court also concluded that the equal footing
doctrine required Texas to surrender its title to the seabed below the
ordinary low water mark when it entered the Union.'25 In the Court's
view, when Texas ceased to be an independent nation upon her
admission to the Union, she became a state on an equal footing with her
sister states. 126 As a result, some aspects of the former republic's
sovereignty were transferred to the United States, including its claim to
the marginal sea.17 Only then would the coastal boundaries of the new
state be the same, both with respect to the federal government and with
respect to the rest of the states.'28
In summary, the equal footing doctrine provides that new states enter
the Union with the same sovereign powers as the original thirteen
states. ' 29  This principle also applies to the ownership of tidelands and
submerged lands beneath navigable lakes and streams. 3 ' Because the
original states retained the submerged lands beneath navigable waters
within their borders when they entered the Union,'3 ' the equal footing
doctrine required that new states also be given title to these submerged
lands within their territory as well.3 2 Although most of the earlier cases
involved tidelands,' the Supreme Court has since extended the equal
footing doctrine to the beds of navigable fresh waters as well.' 34 The
equal footing doctrine also imposed an obligation on the federal
government to hold title to submerged lands beneath navigable waters in
its territories for the benefit of future states.' This meant that the
federal government could not convey these "sovereignty lands" into
private ownership under most circumstances. The Court did recognize
that such conveyances were valid in order to carry out some
international duty or to respond to a public exigency. 136 Even so, the
124 Id.
125 United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. at 717-18.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 718-19.
128 Id. at 719.
129 See Pollard, 44 U.S. at 222-23.
130 Id. at 228-29.
13' See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842).
132 See Pollard, 44 U.S. at 223.
133 See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. I (1894); Knight v. United Land Ass'n, 142 U.S.
161 (1891); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845).
134 See Montana v. United States, 270 U.S. 544 (1981); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387 (1892); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876).
135 See Pollard, 44 U.S. at 222-23.
136 See Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 55.
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Court cautioned that those who based their title on a conveyance from
the federal government prior to statehood had to overcome a strong
presumption against the claim that the government intended to convey
sovereignty lands.137
B. The Public Trust Doctrine
While the states generally own the beds beneath the navigable waters
within their borders, the nature of this ownership differs from that of
ordinary private property. The public aspect of this ownership is
reflected in the trust principle, which upholds the public's right to use
the waters above these submerged lands for navigation, fishing, and
recreation.' Although there were earlier parallels in ancient Roman
law,'39 the modem public trust doctrine traces its origins back to English
common law. 4 ' The English common law distinguished between the
proprietary rights of the King and the rights of the public in tidal
waters.' 4' The proprietary rights of the King to the soil itself were
referred to as the jus privatum. I42 Unauthorized structures on the
foreshore or the beds beneath tidal waters could be seized or removed as
purprestures. 43  However, the King's jus privatum was subject to the
public right of fishing and navigation known as the jus publicum144
In the United States, the public trust doctrine evolved through a series
of nineteenth century decisions by state and federal courts. 145 Martin v.
Waddell, 46 one of the first Supreme Court cases to discuss the public
trust doctrine, involved a dispute over certain oyster beds in the Raritan
River in the township of Perth Amboy, New Jersey. 147  The plaintiff
based his claim to the beds on two charters that were issued by Charles
137 See Montana, 270 U.S. at 556; United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935). But see
Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 632.
138 See generally, Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
139 See Comment, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometimes Submerged Traditional
Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 763-64 (1970).
140 See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOwA L. REV. 631, 633-35 (1986).
141 See Richard Ausness, Water Rights, The Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of
Instream Uses, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 407, 410-11.
142 See Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the
Source of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENvTL. L. 425, 430-31 (1989).
143 See Gough v. Bell, 22 N.J.L. 441, 477 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1850).
144 See Matthew Hale, A Treatise Relative to the Maritime Law of England in Three Parts,
reprinted in STUART MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING
THERETO 370, 389-90 (1888).
145 See, e.g., Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. I (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1821).
14 41 U.S. 367 (1842).
147 Id. at 407.
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II to his brother, James, the Duke of York in 1664 and 1674.148 The
defendant's claim to make exclusive use of the oyster beds was based
on a statutory, grant from the State of New Jersey in 1824.149 The
principal issue was whether the grant from King Charles, and
subsequent grants from the proprietors of the East Jersey colony to
private individuals, also conveyed an exclusive right to fish in adjacent
tidal or navigable waters. 50
The Court began with a consideration of English law and concluded
that public rights to fishing and navigation in tideland areas were
recognized at the time that the king held title to the beds beneath such
waters. The Court found that these rights were held in public trust by
the king "for the benefit and advantage of the whole community."''
Consequently, it was highly likely that if the King conveyed ownership
of the tidelands when he granted the territory of eastern New Jersey to
the Duke of York, he would have done so subject to the same public
trust that applied to tidelands in England.'52 Furthermore, during the
colonial period, the residents of New Jersey exercised their right to take
fish and shellfish from tidal waters "without opposition or
remonstrance" from the colony's proprietors.' 53 After the American
Revolution, "the people of each state became themselves sovereign; and
in that character [held] the absolute right to all their navigable waters
and the soils, under them, for their own common use, subject only to the
rights since surrendered by the constitution to the general
government."' 5 4 Consequently, the Court concluded that the plaintiff
was not entitled to exclusive use of the oyster beds.'55
A half century later, the Supreme Court decided Illinois Central
Railroad Company v. Illinois, which affirmed that the public trust
doctrine that applied to tidelands was also applicable to the beds of
navigable fresh waters.'56 In that case, the State of Illinois brought suit
against the defendant railroad company to determine ownership of
certain reclaimed lands, as well as certain submerged lands, located in
Lake Michigan within the corporate limits of Chicago.'57 The Illinois
148 Id.
149 Id. at 408.
150 Id.





156 146 U.S. 387 (1892). For a discussion of the Illinois Central case, see Eric Pearson,
Illinois Central and the Public Trust Doctrine in State Law, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 713, 721-27
(1996).
157 Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 at 433-34.
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Central Railroad based its claim to virtually all of the Chicago Harbor
on a grant from the Illinois Legislature that had been obtained under
highly suspicious circumstances.' 58 The litigation arose when the state
legislature repealed the grant to the railroad company in 1873."'
The Court began its analysis by declaring that the State of Illinois
"holds title to the lands under the navigable waters of Lake Michigan,
within its limits, in the same manner that the state holds title to soils
under tide water, by common law as we have already shown; and this
title necessarily carries with it control over the waters above them,
whenever the lands are subjected to use."' 6 ° Moreover, the Court went
on to affirm that the states held the beds below fresh water navigable
lakes and streams in trust for its citizens in the same manner that it held
title to tidelands:
It is a title held in trust for the people of the state, that they may
enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over
them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the
obstruction or interference of private parties. The interest of the
people in the navigation of the waters and in commerce over
them may be improved in many instances by the erection of
wharves, docks, and piers therein, for which purpose the state
may grant parcels of the submerged lands; and, so long as their
disposition is made for such purpose, no valid objections can be
made to the grants.... But that is a very different doctrine from
the one which would sanction the abdication of the general
control of the state over lands under the navigable waters of an
entire harbor or bay, or of a sea or lake. Such abdication is not
consistent with the exercise of that trust which requires the
government of the state to preserve such waters for the use of
the public. The trust devolving upon the state for the public,
and which can only be discharged by the management and
control of property in which the public has an interest, cannot be
relinquished by a transfer of the property.' 6
To summarize, the public trust doctrine has its origins in English
common law, which distinguished between the proprietary rights of the
King in the tidelands, known as the jus privatum, and the rights of the
public, known as the jus publicum, which included the right to fish and
navigate in tidal waters.'62 After the American Revolution, the former
158 Id. at 448-49, 451-52.
159 Id. at 449.
160 ld. at452.
161 Id. at 452-53.
162 See Frank E. Maloney & Richard C. Ausness, The Use and Legal Significance of the Mean
High Water Line in Coastal Boundary Mapping, 53 N.C. L. REV. 185, 189-91 (1974).
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colonies states succeeded to the king's interest in submerged lands and
the public trust concept became accepted in most states during the
nineteenth century. '63 According to the public trust doctrine, a state held
title to tidelands and the beds of navigable lakes and streams in trust for
the citizens of that state in order to protect public rights to fishing,
navigation, and recreation.'64 The state could not give up permanent
control over lands subject to this trust though it could authorize
improvements to navigation by private parties.'65
III. NAVIGABILITY FOR PURPOSES OF EXERCISING FEDERAL AUTHORITY
UNDER THE ADMIRALTY AND COMMERCE CLAUSES
The Montana court in PPL Montana adopted a test of navigability for
title purposes that resembled the approach to navigability that has
traditionally been used to define the scope of federal admiralty
jurisdiction and regulatory power under the Commerce Clause. 166
Although this navigability test was originally fairly similar to the test of
navigability for title purposes, over the years it has expanded
considerably in response to the growing exercise of federal regulatory
power over lakes and rivers.
A. Navigability for Purposes of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court first rejected the ebb and flow approach as a test
for navigability in a series of cases involving the admiralty jurisdiction
of federal courts.'67 In the first half of the nineteenth century, several
Supreme Court decisions had adopted the English rule which limited
admiralty jurisdiction to the sea and to tidally affected waters. 168
However, in Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh,'69 the Court overruled these
earlier decisions and concluded that federal courts could exercise
163 See, e.g., Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 3-4.
164 For a discussion of recent developments in the public trust doctrine, see Alexander B.
Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 699, 707-14 (2006); Sarah C. Smith, Note, A Public Trust Argument for Public
Access to Private Conservation Land, 52 DUKE L.J. 629, 639-45 (2002).
165 See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452-53.
166 See PPL Montana, 229 P.3d at 446-47.
167 See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Writs to Rights: "Navigability" and the Transformation of the
Common Law in the Nineteenth Century, 23 CARDOZO L. REV, 1049, 1097-1105 (2002); Milton
Conover, The Abandonment of the "Tidewater" Concept of Admiralty Jurisdiction in the United
States, 38 OR. L. REV. 24 (1958).
168 See United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. 72 (1838); The Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, 36
U.S. 175 (1837); Hobart v. Drogan, 35 U.S. 108 (1836); The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23
U.S. 428 (1825).
169 53 U.S. 443 (1851).
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admiralty jurisdiction in navigable fresh waters as well as tidal waters.'70
In Genesee Chief the owners of the schooner Cuba brought suit against
the owners of the propeller steamship Genesee Chief which collided
with their vessel and caused it to sink.' 7' The accident occurred in the
waters of Lake Ontario as the Cuba was sailing from Sandusky, Ohio to
Oswego, New York.'72 The libellants claimed that the accident was
caused by the negligence of the crew of the Genesee Chief.7 3 The trial
court ruled in favor of the libellants and the federal appeals court
affirmed.174
On appeal, the owner of the Genesee Chief contended that the federal
court had no authority to award damages for the alleged negligence of
the ship's crew because the waters of Lake Ontario were not subject to
the ebb and flow of the tides and, therefore, not navigable under the
common law test of navigability. I" In response, the libellant
maintained that Congress had extended the scope of federal admiralty
jurisdiction to the Great Lakes and their connecting waters by statute. 17 6
The Court began by declaring that federal admiralty jurisdiction derived
from the Constitution, not from any particular statute.'77 Therefore, the
Court reasoned, the statutory expansion of federal admiralty jurisdiction
would only be constitutional if the Great Lakes and the navigable waters
connecting them were understood to be within the scope of the federal
government's admiralty jurisdiction when the Constitution was
adopted.'78
According to the Court, the Great Lakes and their connecting waters
had always been considered to be navigable waters and, therefore,
should also be subject to admiralty law as administered by the federal
courts.'79 In support of this conclusion, the Court observed that:
These lakes are in truth inland seas. Different states border on
them on one side and a foreign nation on the other. A great and
growing commerce is carried on upon them between different
states and a foreign nation, which is subject to all the incidents
and hazards that attend commerce on the ocean. Hostile fleets




174 Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. at 45 1.
175 Id. at 454.
176 Id. (citing 5 Stat. 726 (1845)). The statute in question was drafted by Justice Story. See
Note, From Judicial Grant to Legislative Power: The Admiralty Clause in the Nineteenth
Century, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1222-26 (1954).
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have encountered on them, and prizes have been made; and
every reason which existed for the grant of admiralty
jurisdiction to the general government on the Atlantic seas,
applies with equal force to the lakes. There is an equal necessity
for the instance and for the prize power of the admiralty court to
administer international law, and if the one cannot be
established neither can the other. 180
The Court also pointed out that the ebb and flow of the tide did not have
any inherent relationship to admiralty jurisdiction. "8I While
acknowledging that admiralty jurisdiction was confined to tidewaters in
England, this was due to the fact that only tidal waters were actually
navigable in that country.8 2 The same was also true of the original
states where most navigable waters were also tidewaters. I"3 However,
two developments had occurred since that time that undermined the
utility of the ebb and flow test: First, the expansion of the political
boundaries of the United States resulted in the potential commercial use
of large freshwater rivers and lakes as these territories were occupied
and settled."4 Second, the invention of the steamboat made it possible
for these fresh water rivers and lakes to become highways of
commerce. 1
85
It would be impracticable under these circumstances, the Court
declared, to limit admiralty jurisdiction to tidewaters:
It is evident that a definition that would at this day limit public
rivers in this country to tide-water rivers is utterly inadmissible.
We have thousands of miles of public navigable water,
including lakes and rivers in which there is no tide. And
certainly there can be no reason for admiralty power over a
public tide-water, which does not apply with equal force to any
other public water used for commercial purposes and foreign
trade. The lakes and waters connecting them are undoubtedly
public waters; and we think are within the grant of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction in the Constitution of the United
States. "'86
180 Id. at 453-54.
181 id. at454.
182 Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. at 454-55.
183 Id. at 455.
184 Id. at 457.
185 id. Other Supreme Court decisions of the period made this same observation. See, e.g.,
The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. 555, 562 (1866); Waring v. Clark, 46 U.S. 441, 466 (1847) (Catron,
J., concurring).
186 Genesee Chief 53 U.S. at 457.
2013]
Virginia Environmental Law Journal
Turning to the merits of the case, the Court then affirmed the lower
courts' judgment for the libellants. 187
The Court's holding in the Genesee Chief was subsequently affirmed
in Jackson v. The Steamboat Magnolia.'88 The plaintiffs in the case
filed a libel in federal court alleging that the defendant's vessel, the
steamboat Magnolia, collided with their steamboat Wetumpka, while
sailing along the Alabama River, causing it to sink.'89 The defendant
contended that the federal court had no admiralty jurisdiction in the case
because the accident occurred well upstream beyond the tide-water
area. 90 The lower court agreed with the defendant's argument and
dismissed the lawsuit. '91
Arguing before the Supreme Court, the defendant attempted to
distinguish the Genesee Chief-decision by claiming that the admiralty
court's jurisdiction in that case was based on a federal statute that only
applied to the Great Lakes. 92 The Court, however, reaffirmed the
principle that federal admiralty jurisdiction derived from the
Constitution, not from any particular statute. 193 Furthermore, the Court
declared, confining federal admiralty jurisdiction to tidewaters would
discriminate against residents of western states whose navigable waters
were not subject to the ebb and flow of the tides. 94 Therefore, the Court
reversed the lower court and allowed to plaintiffs' claim to proceed.'95
The Court's reasoning in the Genesee Chief and Magnolia decisions
were reaffirmed several times during the nineteenth century. 96 in re
Petition of Boyer'9 7 is of particular interest because the Court relied on
the reasoning of Genesee Chief to conclude that federal admiralty
jurisdiction extended to artificial as well as natural fresh watercourses.
In that case, the owners of a canal-boat, Brilliant, filed a libel against a
steam-powered canal-boat, the B & C.98 The libellants sought damages
arising out of collision between the two vessels on the Illinois and Lake
Michigan Canal. 199 The Brilliant was struck by the B & C while it was
187 Id. at 463.
188 61 U.S. 296 (1857).
189 Id. at 297.
190 Id. at 297-98.
191 Id. at 298.
192 Id. at 300.
193 Jackson, 61 U.S. at 300-01.
'94 ld. at 302.
19' Id.
196 See, e.g., In re Petition of Boyer, 109 U.S. 629, 631-32 (1884); The Eagle, 75 U.S. 15, 21 -
22 (1868); The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. 555, 566-67 (1866).
197 109 U.S. 629 (1884).
198 Id. at 630.
199 Id.
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being towed, along with other canal-boats, by a steam canal-boat.20 0 As
a result of the collision, the Brilliant sank, along with her cargo °.20  A
federal district court, sitting as an admiralty court, ruled that both
vessels were at fault and that each party would have to pay half of the
assessed damages. 2 In response, the owners of the B & C sought a writ
of prohibition from the Supreme Court claiming that federal admiralty
jurisdiction did not extend to the Canal. 20 3
The Court acknowledged that the ninety-six-mile-long canal, which
connected the Mississippi River and the Illinois River with Lake
Michigan and the Chicago River, was "an artificial navigable
waterway. '204 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the district court
had jurisdiction over the case, stating:
[N]avigable water situated as this canal is, used for the purposes
for which it is used,-a highway for commerce between ports
and places in different states, carried on by vessels such as those
in question here,-is public water of the United States, and with
the legitimate scope of the admiralty jurisdiction conferred by
the [C]onstitution and statutes of the United States, even though
the canal is wholly artificial, and is wholly within the body of a
state, and subject to its ownership and control; and it makes no
difference as to the jurisdiction of the district court that one or
the other of the vessels was at the time of the collision on a
voyage from one place in the state of Illinois to another place in
that state.205
Accordingly, the Court denied the' defendants' petition for a writ of
prohibition and upheld the jurisdiction of the federal district court.20 6
In summary, federal admiralty jurisdiction extends to all waters that
are capable of supporting navigation and commerce among the states
and with foreign countries. It also includes tidal waters and even waters
in canals and other artificial structures when they are part of an
interconnected water transportation system.
B. Navigability for Purposes of Federal Regulation under the
Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause of the Constitution states that "Congress shall
have the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 In re Petition of Boyer, 109 U.S. at 630-31.
203 Id. at 63 1.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 632.
206 Id.
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the several States, and with the Indian tribes."2"7 From the earliest days
of the Republic, the courts agreed that the power to regulate commerce
included power over the navigable waters of the United States. The
Supreme Court first addressed this issue in 1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden. 8
Aaron Ogden sought to enjoin Thomas Gibbons from operating two
steamboats between New York City and Elizabethtown, New Jersey. 09
Ogden claimed that he was the assignee of Robert Livingston and
Robert Fulton, who had obtained the exclusive right from the New York
Legislature to operate commercial steamboats in that state l.2 " A state
court granted the injunction and the New York Court for the Trial of
Impeachments and Correction of Errors affirmed. 211 The defendant
claimed the right to navigate in the waters along the shores of New
York because he was licensed to do so pursuant to a federal statute
which regulated the coastal trade.2t2 On appeal, the Suprem6 Court held
that commerce included navigation.2 " According to the Court:
All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the
word "commerce," to comprehend navigation. It was so
understood, and must have been understood, when the
[C]onstitution was framed. The power over commerce,
including navigation, was one of the primary objects for which
the people of America adopted their government, and must have
contemplated in forming it. The convention must have used the
word in that sense, because all have understood it in that sense;
and the attempt [by the Plaintiff] to restrict it comes too late. 214
The Court went on to declare that the power of Congress to regulate
interstate and foreign commerce was "plenary" and, therefore, included
the power to regulate shipping in waters that were within the territorial
boundaries of New York.2 5 Having concluded that Congress had the
power to license coastal shipping such as that engaged in by the
defendant, the Court held that New York did not have the power to
restrict navigation in its waters as the plaintiff claimed.216
The first case to offer a broader test of navigability for regulatory
purposes was Daniel Ball,"17 decided in 1870. The Daniel Ball, a 123-
207 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8., e. 3.
208 22 U.S. I (1824).
209 Id. at 1-2.
210 Id. at2.
211 Id. at3.
212 Id. at 2-3.
213 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 190.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 197, 211.
216 Id. at 221.
217 77 U.S. 557 (1870).
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ton steamship, was engaged in the transportation of passengers and
cargo along the Grand River between Grand Rapids and Grand Haven
in the state Michigan. 218 The United States filed a libel against the
vessel, alleging that it had failed to comply with federal inspection and
licensing laws.2 19 The vessel's owners claimed that the waters of the
Grand River were not navigable waters of the United States.220 On
appeal, the Court reiterated its conclusion in the Genesee Chief that
fresh water rivers and lakes could be navigable even though they were
not subject to the ebb and flow of the tides. 221 The Court then
enunciated the following test for navigability:
"Those Rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in
law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact
when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their
ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade
and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of
trade and travel on water. 22
During the course of the nineteenth century, the Court affirmed the
powers of the federal government over navigable waters. For example,
in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Company, the Court
upheld the power of Congress to authorize the construction and
maintenance of a bridge across the Ohio River even though it obstructed
traffic on the river.224 A similar issue arose in Gilman v. Philadelphia,225
where the owner of a wharf objected to the construction of a bridge
across the Schuylkill River, whose elevation was such that it would
prevent sailing ships with tall masts from using the wharf.2 6 Even
though navigation on the river would be obstructed, the Court observed
that "bridges, which are connecting parts of turnpikes, streets, and
railroads, are means of transportation, as well as navigable waters, and
that the commerce which passes over a bridge may be much greater than
would ever be transported on the water it obstructs. '27 However, the
Court added that the state was free to authorize the bridge as long as
Congress had not seen fit to regulate the construction of bridges along
the river.228
218 Id. at 558.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 559.
221 Id. at 563.
222 Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563.
223 59 U.S. 421 (1855).
224 Id. at430.
225 70 U.S. 713 (1865).
226 Id. at 72 1.
227 Id. at 729.
228 Id. at 732.
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The power of the federal government to construct improvements to
navigation was upheld in South Carolina v. Georgia.2 9 In that case, the
federal government obstructed one channel on the Savannah River in
order to route shipping through another channel. 30 The Court upheld
this decision, declaring that the United States "may build light-houses in
the bed of the stream. It may construct jetties. It may require all
navigators to pass along a prescribed channel, and may close over any
other channel to their passage. '"231
In the twentieth century, disputes about the scope of federal
regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause often arose in
connection with license applications to the Federal Power Commission
by hydroelectric power companies. One of the first cases to consider
the extent of federal power in this context was Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority.232 In Ashwander, the Tennessee Valley Authority
("TVA") purchased certain substations, transmission lines, and other
property from the Alabama Power Company. 233 As part of this
transaction, Alabama Power agreed to purchase "surplus power"
produced by the TVA's Wilson Dam, which was located on the
Tennessee River.234 A number of Alabama Power shareholders objected
to the contract, arguing that the TVA did not have the constitutional
authority to enter into it. 235 The shareholders contended that the TVA's
authority to construct and operate the Wilson Dam arose from
Congress's powers under its war and commerce powers. 236
Consequently, the shareholders reasoned that the TVA could do nothing
with respect to the Dam that did not promote national defense or
improve navigation.237
The Court observed that the Tennessee River was navigable even
though shoals, reefs, and rapids obstructed navigation at various
points.238 Nevertheless, the Court declared that "[it was] not at liberty to
conclude either that the river is not susceptible of development as an
important waterway, or that Congress has not undertaken that
development, or that the construction of the Wilson Dam was not an
appropriate means to accomplish a legitimate end." 239 Having
229 93 U.S. 4 (1876).
230 Id. at II.
231 Id. at 11-12.
232 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
233 Id. at 315.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 322.
236 Id. at 326-27.
237 Ashivander, 297 U.S. at 326-27.
238 Id. at 328.
239 Id. at 329-330.
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concluded that the TVA had the constitutional power to construct and
operate the Wilson Dam, the Court went on to conclude that the surplus
power produced by the Dam was property of the federal government
that it could dispose of by selling to Alabama Power.240 Therefore, the
Court upheld the validity of the contract despite the fact that it did not
directly affect navigation.24'
In First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power
Commission,2 41 the Supreme Court held that an applicant did not
necessarily have to comply with state regulations in order to obtain a
federal license from the Federal Power Commission ("FPC").2 43 The
power company proposed to construct a hydroelectric dam on the Cedar
River near Moscow, Iowa. 2" The Court found that the proposed power
plant would significantly affect navigation on the Cedar, Iowa, and
Mississippi Rivers. 45 Consequently, there was no doubt that the power
company had to obtain a license from the FPC.2 46 However, the State of
Iowa, which was opposed to the project, contended that the FPC could
not issue a license unless the applicant first obtained a state permit.247
The Court rejected the State's claim, declaring that:
To require the petitioner to secure the actual grant to it of a State
permit under § 7767 as a condition precedent to securing a
federal license for the same project under the Federal Power Act
would vest in the Executive Council of Iowa a veto power over
the federal project. Such a veto power easily could destroy the
effectiveness of the federal act. It would subordinate to the
control of the State the 'comprehensive' planning which the Act
provides shall depend on the judgment of the Federal Power
Commission or other representatives of the Federal
Government.248
Accordingly, the Court ruled that the FPC should continue with the
licensing proceedings even though the applicant had not obtained a state
permit for the proposed project.249
United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Company2 ° was one
of the first cases to extend the scope of the federal government's
240 Id. at 335-37.
241 Id. at 340.
242 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
243 Id. at 182-83.
244 Id. at 157-58.
245 Id. at 163.
246 Id.
247 First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop., 328 U.S. at 164.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 182-83.
250 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
Virginia Environmental Law Journal
regulatory powers beyond traditional navigable waters. In that case, the
United States sought injunctive relief to prevent the defendant from
constructing a dam across the Rio Grande River in order to appropriate
water for irrigation, municipal, and manufacturing uses.25' The parties
agreed that the Rio Grande was not navigable in the area of New
Mexico where the dam was to be constructed.252 The New Mexico
territorial court held that because the river was not navigable, the federal
government had no authority to prevent the construction of the dam. 53
The United States contended that it had the power to protect the
navigable character of the river downstream where it was in fact
navigable. To support this claim, the United States relied on a provision
of the Rivers and Harbors Act 254 which prohibited unauthorized
obstructions to the navigable capacity of any waters over which the
United States had jurisdiction.255
On appeal, the Court acknowledged that Congress had consented to
the replacement of the common law natural flow doctrine by the prior
appropriation system which allowed persons to divert water from a river
or stream in order to put it to a beneficial use on non-riparian land. 56
However, the Court refused to concede that Congress would have
authorized appropriators to divert water from non-navigable tributaries
in such a way as to impede the navigability of the navigable waters into
which they flowed. The Court stated that:
To hold that [C]ongress, by these acts, meant to confer upon any
state the right to appropriate all the waters of the tributary
streams which united into a navigable water course, and so
destroy the navigability of that water course in derogation of the
interests of all the people of the United States, is a construction
which cannot be tolerated.. 257
The Court concluded that it was proper for the United States to enjoin
construction of the dam under the Rivers and Harbors Act because its
prohibition against obstructions was not limited to obstructions on
navigable waters, but also extended to any obstruction, such as the one
contemplated by the defendant, that tended "to destroy the navigable
251 Id. at 701.
252 Id. at 698.
253 Id. at 696.
254 26 Stat. 454 § 10 (1890).
255 174 U.S. at 707-08.
256 Id. at 706. For a discussion of the prior appropriation system, see Waters & Water Rights
§§ 12.01-12.02 (Robert E. Beck, ed.) (3d ed. 2009); Richard C. Ausness, Water Righs, The
Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of Instream Uses, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 407, 418-21
(1986).
257 United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. at 706.
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capacity of one of the navigable waters of the United States."2 58
Accordingly, the Court remanded the case back to the lower courts to
determine whether the proposed appropriation of water from the Rio
Grande would "substantially diminish the navigability of that stream
within the limits of present day navigability, and if so, to enter a decree
restraining those acts to the extent that they will so diminish." '259
It should also be noted that waters that were formerly navigable in
fact will continue to be treated as navigable for purposes of federal
Commerce Clause regulation. For example, in Economy Light & Power
Company v. United States,260 the United States sought to enjoin a power
company from constructing a dam across the Des Plaines River near
Joliet, Illinois without obtaining permission from Congress and various
federal officials.26 ' The lower courts agreed that the river was navigable
and that construction of the dam violated federal law. 62
The Court observed that the dam site was located just above the point
where the Des Plaines River joins the Kankakee River to form the
Illinois River. 263 It was undisputed that there was no evidence of
commercial navigation on the river within living memory.264 On the
other hand, the Court pointed out that the river had once been part of an
interstate fur trading network up until about 1825.265 The river ceased to
be used for this purpose after that time because fur trading activities
moved westward and physical changes affected the river's
navigability. 266 The Court affirmed that if a river had the capacity to
support commercial activity in its natural state, then Congress could act
to preserve it "for purposes of future transportation, even though it be
not at present used for such commerce, and be incapable of such use
according to present methods, either by reason of changed conditions or
because of artificial obstructions. 267
The Court has also held that a river that was not navigable in its
normal state would be considered to be navigable for purposes of
federal regulation under the Commerce Clause if it could be made
navigable with reasonable improvements. 268 United States v.
Appalachian Electric Power Company involved a dispute between the
258 Id. at 708.
259 id. at710.
260 256 U.S. 113 (1921).
261 Id. at 115.
262 Id. at 115-16.
263 Id. at 116.
264 Id. at 117.
265 Econ. Light & Power Co., 256 U.S. at 117.
266 Id. at 117-18.
267 Id. at 123.
268 See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407-08 (1940).
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FPC and a power company that wished to construct a dam on the New
River near Radford, Virginia.2 69 Initially, the FPC had made a finding
that the river was non-navigable, but that "the project would affect the
interests of interstate and foreign commerce," and therefore found that
the power company must be subject to a license from the FPC before
beginning construction on the dam.270 At a later hearing, however, a
minority of the FPC found that the river was navigable, but the majority
maintained that the FPC's jurisdiction was proper on its original basis.27" '
The power company, on the other hand, claimed inferentially that the
river was not navigable at the location of the proposed dam and,
consequently, the FPC had no authority to require the company to seek
a license.272 When the power company began construction on the dam
in 1934, the United States sought an injunction to prevent it from
proceeding any further without first obtaining a license from the FPC.273
Both the district court and a federal appeals court concluded that the
New River was not navigable in its natural state and refused to grant the
injunction.27 4
The Court began with an analysis of the concept of navigability and
its relation to federal regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause.
According to the Court, navigability "is not to be determined by a
formula which fits every type of stream under all circumstances and all
times." '275 Accordingly, the Court cautioned that it did "not purport now
to lay down any single definitive test. 276 Instead, the Court declared
that it must "draw from the prior decisions in this field and apply them,
with due regard to the dynamic nature of the problem, to the particular
circumstances presented by the New River." 277 The Court then
considered whether a determination of navigability should focus solely
on the river in its "natural or ordinary condition" as set forth in Daniel
Ball.278 The Court observed that natural or ordinary conditions referred
to the volume of water in the river as well as the gradient and the
regularity of flow.279 However, it declared that the potential availability
for navigation must also be considered.280 Therefore, a watercourse that
269 Id. at 398.
270 Id. at 399-400.
271 Id. at400-01.
272 Id. at 400.
273 Id. at401.
274 United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. at 403.
275 Id. at 404.
276 ld
277 ld
278 Id. at 406-07.
279 United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. at 407.
280 Id.
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was otherwise suitable for navigation should be treated as navigable
even though artificial aids were necessary to make it actually usable for
commercial navigation.281' Furthermore, the Court stated that it was not
"necessary that the improvements should be actually completed or even
authorized. ' 2 2 The only limit on this bootstrapping definition of
navigability was that the improvements must be "reasonable." '283 The
Court acknowledged that reasonableness involved a "balance between
cost and need at a time when the improvement would be useful." '284
Finally, the Court pointed out that navigability for purposes of
regulating commerce was not static as it was for title purposes, but
could evolve or develop in accordance with changes in the nature of
commerce and navigation. 85
The Court started with a detailed description of the New River and
the history of commercial activity in the vicinity of the dam site. The
New River originated in western Virginia near the North Carolina
border and flows northward some 250 miles to Kanawha Falls, West
Virginia. From there, the river, now called the Kanawha, flowed
another 100 miles northwest to Point Pleasant, West Virginia, where it
joined the Ohio River. 86 The Court noted that the entire area below
Kanawha Falls was broken and mountainous. 87 The Court focused on
three contiguous sections of the river: (1) a twenty-eight-mile stretch
between Allisonia and Radford; (2) a fifty-nine-mile stretch from
Radford to Wiley's Falls; and (3) a twenty-four-mile stretch from
Wiley's Falls to Hinton, West Virginia.288 The evidence revealed that
the portions of the river above and below the Radford-Wiley's Falls
section had been improved in the nineteenth century and were used to
transport lumber, tobacco, pig iron, and other products in keelboats to
various railroad depots. 289 The critical stretch of river where the
defendant's proposed dam was located had not been improved and
navigation would have been impeded along portions of the river by
boulders and rapids; nevertheless, there was some sporadic commercial
traffic along this part of the river between the Civil War and the coming
of the Norfolk & Western and Chesapeake & Ohio Railroads to the area
281 Id.
282 Id. at 408.
283 Id. at 407-08.
284 United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. at 407-08.
285 Id. at 408-09.
286 Id. at410.
287 Id..
288 Id. at 41I.
289 United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. at 411-12.
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in the 1880s.290 This led the Court to conclude that "the evidence of
actual use of the Radford-Wiley's Falls section for commerce and for
private convenience, when taken in connection with its physical
condition make it quite plain that by reasonable improvement the reach
would be navigable for the type of boats employed on the less
obstructed sections."' 29' Accordingly, the Court determined that the
entire New River was navigable.292
Kaiser Aetna v. United States293 illustrates the principle that non-
navigable waters may be subject to federal regulation if they become
connected to navigable waters. That case involved a dispute between
the United States and the lessees of the Hawaii Kai Marina. 294 The
marina was created from the Kuapa Pond, a 523-acre lagoon. Early
Hawaiians had connected the lagoon to Maunalua Bay on the Pacific
Ocean by means of sluice gates and used it as a fishpond.2 95 When
Kaiser Aetna acquired the property in 1961, the plaintiff dredged Kuapa
Pond to create a marina and built a residential subdivision around it. 29 6
Later, with the acquiescence of the United States Army Corps of
Engineers, the defendant dredged an eight-foot channel between Kuapa
Pond and Maunalua Bay in order to enable boats from the marina to
obtain access to the bay.297
In 1972, however, the Corps of Engineers changed its position and
informed Kaiser Aetna that it would have to obtain a permit if it decided
to engage in any future dredging, filling, or excavation operations in the
marina and that it would also have to allow public access to the
marina.298 Kaiser Aetna challenged this decision, but a lower court
concluded that the waters of the marina became navigable waters of the
United States, and therefore became subject to federal regulation under
the Rivers and Harbors Act when the waters became connected to
Maunalua Bay.299 The federal appeals court agreed with the lower
court. 00 On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that Kuapa Pond had
290 Id. at415-16.
291 Id. at 416-17.
292 Id. at418-19.
293 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
294 The marina was part of an "ahupua'a" or land grant that eventually became the property of
Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop, a descendant of King Kamehemeha 1. The Bishop Estate leased
a 6000-acre portion of the ahupua'a to the defendant, Kaiser Aetna. Id. at 167.
295 Id. Water entered the lagoon from the ocean through the sluice gates during high tide and
flowed out again during low tide. Id. at 166.
296 Id. at 167.
297 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 167.
298 Id. at 168.
299 Id. at 168-69.
300 378 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1978).
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now become part of the navigable waters of the United States and was
thus subject to federal regulation.30' However, the Court declared that
the Corps had no authority to require Kaiser Aetna to provide public
access to the marina unless the government paid compensation."0
IV. NAVIGABILITY FOR TITLE PURPOSES
The English "ebb and flow" rule was adopted by most of the
colonies.303 However, in the first half of the nineteenth century, a
number of state courts concluded that this approach was unsuitable for
the United States with its large number of navigable, inland freshwater
rivers and streams.30 4 Consequently, courts abandoned the English rule
and concluded that the state should hold title to the beds of all waters
that were navigable-in-fact, regardless of whether these waters were
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. 05
As the navigability-in-fact test displaced the common law ebb and
flow approach, questions arose about the ownership of tidelands that
were located beneath non-navigable waters. A majority of state courts
concluded that the ebb and flow test was not entirely displaced, but
continued to control in such cases.30 6 Accordingly, these courts ruled
that the states continued to retain title to tidelands beneath non-
navigable waters.307 On a number of occasions, the United States
Supreme Court also suggested that the states owned the tidelands within
their borders regardless of whether they were covered by navigable
waters.3 8. The Court finally resolved the question once and for all in
Phillips Petroleum Company v. Mississippi.09
The Phillips Petroleum case involved a dispute over certain tideland
areas in southwestern Mississippi near the Gulf Coast.310 Plaintiffs
301 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 172-73.
302 Id. at 174-80.
303 Id. at 181.
304 See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 286 (1997) (discussing cases in
various states rejecting the "ebb and flow" test).
305 See, e.g., Young v. Harrison, 6 Ga. 130 (Ga. 1849); Bullock v. Wilson, 2 Port. 436 (Ala.
1835); Spring v. Russell, 7 Me. 273 (Me. 1831); Wilson v. Forbes, 13 N.C. 30 (N.C. 1828); Cates
v. Wadlington, 12 S.C.L. 580 (S.C.L. 1822); Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810).
306 See, e.g., Wright v. Seymour, 10 P. 323, 324-26 (Cal. 1886); State v. Pinckney, 22 S.C.
484, 507-09 (S.C. 1885); Simons v. French, 25 Conn. 346, 352-53 (Conn. 1856).
307 See Wright, 10 P. at 326-27; Pinckney, 22 S.C. at 507-08; Simons, 25 Conn. at 352-53.
308 See, e.g., Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15 (1935); Appleby v. City of
New York, 271 U.S. 364, 381 (1926); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894); Illinois Cent.
R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161,
183 (1891); McReady v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 394 (1877); Weber v. Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S.
57, 65 (1873).
309 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
310 See Cinque Bambini P'ship v. State of Mississippi, 491 So. 2d 508, 510 (Miss. 1986).
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Cinque Bambini and other property owners traced their title to about
2400 acres of tidelands back to Spanish land grants made prior to
statehood. "' In 1977, the Mississippi Mineral Lease Commission
leased the Cinque Bambini property to Saga Petroleum.3 12 The plaintiffs
then brought suit against the State to revoke the leases and to confirm
their title.313 The Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that about forty-two
acres were public trust lands that had been acquired by the state fiom
the federal government at the time of statehood.314 The United States
Supreme Court granted the property owner's petition for certiorari to
review the Mississippi court's decision.315
Mississippi contended that it had acquired title to all of the tidelands
within its borders under the equal footing doctrine at the time of
statehood in 1817.316 The property owners maintained that Mississippi
did not acquire title to tidelands beneath non-navigable waters under the
equal footing doctrine.317 Instead, they argued that under the equal
footing doctrine, the state only acquired title to submerged land beneath
navigable waters but not to lands beneath tidal waters unless these
waters were navigable in fact.318
The Court began by observing that, "[t]he new States admitted into
the Union since the adoption of the Constitution have the same rights as
the original States in the tide waters, and the lands under them, within
their respective jurisdictions."'3 19 The Court then proceeded to examine
the status of tidelands within the original colonies and concluded that
they all followed the English rule that tidelands were owned by the
sovereign.320 The Court then addressed the argument that under federal
law, ownership of submerged lands was based on navigability-in-fact
rather than the existence of tidal influence. The Court acknowledged
that navigability-in-fact was the appropriate basis for determining
ownership to the submerged lands beneath fresh waters; however, it
maintained that the rule was otherwise in the case of tidelands.32" '
311 Id. at 511. Spain claimed portions of southern Mississippi and Alabama as part of its
Florida colony. Spain eventually relinquished her claim to the area when it was ceded to the
United States, along with the rest of Florida, by treaty in 1819. See Michael H. Hoflheimer,
Mississippi Courts 1790-1868, 65 Miss. L.J. 99, 102 n.9 (1995).
312 Cinque Bambini P ship, 491 So. 2d at 510.
313 Id.
314 Id. at 514.
315 See Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi, 479 U.S. 1084 (1987).
316 See Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 472 (1988).
317 Id. at475.
318 Id.
319 Id. at 474 (quoting Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894)).
320 Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 475-76.
321 Id. at 479-80.
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To support this conclusion, the Court relied heavily on Mann v.
Tacoma Land Company.3 22 In that case, the plaintiff accepted scrip
from the federal government in exchange for surrendering his claim to
certain lands in California purportedly granted by the Mexican
government prior to 1848.323 This gave him the right to use the scrip to
acquire a comparable amount of unoccupied and unappropriated public
lands belonging to the United States.3"4 The plaintiff then proceeded to
claim certain "tide flats" or "mud flats" located in Commencement Bay
near Tacoma, Washington.325 This property was covered by two to four
feet of water during high tide, but was entirely exposed during low
tide.326 In spite of this, the Court concluded that title to these tidelands
was transferred as public trust lands to the State of Washington upon its
admission to the Union in 1889.327 Consequently, it held that these
tidelands were not federal "public lands" subject to appropriation by
private individuals.32 8 Following the reasoning of the Mann decision,
the Court in Phillips Petroleum rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
only tidelands beneath navigable waters were subject to the public trust
and, therefore, not normally subject to private ownership. 329
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Mississippi Supreme Court's
decision in favor of the State.3
Nevertheless, the federal courts rejected the ebb and flow test as the
sole test for title in the nineteenth century, just as they did for purposes
of admiralty jurisdiction and Commerce Clause regulation. 31' For
example, in Packer v. Bird, 332 the Supreme Court held that the
Sacramento River in California was navigable for a considerable
distance above the tidewater area.333 Consequently, the Court rejected
the plaintiffs contention that a patent from the United States to property
bounded by the river extended to the middle of the stream and included
an island in the middle of the stream.334 The Court adopted the Daniel
Ball navigability-in-fact test because it felt that the ebb and flow test
322 153 U.S. 273 (1894).
323 Id. at 285.
324 Id.
325 Id. at 283.
326 Id. at 273.
327 Mann, 153 U.S. at 284.
328 Id.
329 Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 483-84.
330 Id. at 484-85.
331 See Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of the Common-
Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781, 801-03 (2010).
332 137 U.S. 661 (1891).
333 Id. at 662.
334 Id. at 666.
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was inappropriate for a nation with large freshwater rivers and
streams. 35 As the Court pointed out, "[i]t is, indeed, the. susceptibility
to use as highways of commerce which gives sanction to the public right
of control over navigation upon them, and consequently to the exclusion
of private ownership, either of the waters or the soils under them. 336
In the twentieth century, the Court addressed a number of additional
issues associated with the navigability-in-fact test. In Oklahoma v.
Texas337 the state of Oklahoma invoked the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction to resolve a dispute over title to the bed of the Red River.338
Oklahoma asserted title to the entire riverbed; Texas claimed the
southern half; and the United States, in its own right and on behalf of
certain Indian allottees, maintained that it owned most of the bed
because the river was not navigable. "I The controversy was
exacerbated by the fact that valuable oil and gas deposits had been
discovered beneath portions of the riverbed.3 41 In an earlier opinion, the
Court concluded that the boundary between Texas and Oklahoma was
the southern bank of the Red River;341 therefore, Oklahoma v. Texas was
solely concerned with the respective rights of Oklahoma and the federal
government and its allottees.342
The Court observed that the Red River originates in the Panhandle
area of northwestern Texas and ultimately flows into the Mississippi
River in eastern Louisiana.343 Of its 1300-mile length, about 550 miles
of the Red River are in Louisiana and Arkansas, another 540 miles form
part of the border between Texas and Oklahoma, while the remaining
portion of the river is wholly in Texas.3 44 The principal area in dispute
was a forty-three-mile stretch located near the Texas border, about 410
miles upstream from the eastern boundary of Oklahoma.3 45
Oklahoma claimed that the Red River was navigable along its entire
border with Texas.346 Consequently, under the equal footing doctrine,
the state acquired title to the bed of the river at the time of statehood.347
In response, the Court applied the Daniel Ball navigability-in-fact test to
335 Id. at 667.
336 Id.
337 258 U.S. 574 (1922).
338 Id. at 579.
339 Id.
340 Id. at 579-80.
341 See Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U.S. 70 (1921).




346 Id. at 583.
347 Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. at 583.
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determine if the Red River was actually navigable and concluded that
rainfall patterns and physical topography prevented the river from being
navigable in the western half of the state. 348 The evidence was
somewhat more ambiguous with regard to the eastern part of the state.
Although there were occasional attempts at commercial navigation on
the river during periods of high water, the Court ultimately found that
the eastern part of the Red River was "neither used, nor susceptible of
being used, in its natural and ordinary condition as a highway for
commerce."' 349  Since no part of the Red River in Oklahoma was
navigable, the Court held that title to the riverbed did not pass to the
state upon its admission to the Union.350 The Court also concluded that
the United States did not convey title to the riverbed to the Kiowa,
Comanche, or Apache Indians when it established a Reservation for
them in 1867.35'
Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Company v. United States352 involved a suit
by the United States on its own behalf and as trustee for the Osage
Indian Tribe against a number of oil companies who had leased portions
of the bed of the Arkansas River from the state of Oklahoma.353 The
trial court ruled that the river had always been non-navigable and that
the federal government had conveyed the bed of the river up to the
channel to the Osage Tribe prior to statehood.354 The federal appeals
court affirmed title in the Osage Tribe, noting that the United States had
the power to convey the bed of the Arkansas River to the Osage Indians
in 1872, whether the river was navigable or not. "I In response,
Oklahoma argued that the Arkansas River was navigable and, therefore,
the federal government held title to the riverbed in trust for the citizens
of the future state and did not have the power to convey the riverbed to
the Indian Tribes.356
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed that the validity and effect of
an act done by the United States is a federal question. 357 Furthermore,
"[t]he title of the Indians grows out of a federal grant when the Federal
government had complete sovereignty over the territory in question. 35 8
Therefore, the Court concluded that federal, not state, law must
348 Id. at 587-88.
349 Id. at 591.
350 Id. at 591-92.
351 Id. at 592-98,
352 260 U.S. 77 (1922).
353 Id. at 79.
354 Id. at 79-80.
355 270 F. 100 (8th Cir. 1920).
356 Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co., 260 U.S. at 83.
357 Id. at 87.
358 Id.
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determine the navigability of the Arkansas River. 359  Accordingly, the
Court applied the Daniel Ball formula to determine whether the
Arkansas River was navigable or not.3 60 Under this test, the Court found
that the Arkansas River became navigable near Fort Gibson, Oklahoma,
which was located some distance downstream from the Osage
Reservation.36" ' Since the river was not navigable at the point where the
bed was granted to the Osage Tribe, the Court determined that the land
in question must necessarily belong to the Osage Tribe and not the State
of Oklahoma. 362 For this reason, the Court affirmed the decision of the
appeals court.363
United States v. Holt State Bank3 64 illustrates the fact that navigability
for title purposes is determined at the time of statehood. In that case,
the United States brought a quiet title action against various landowners
whose title was derived from the State of Minnesota.3 65 The land in
question was part of the bed of Mud Lake, a 5000-acre lake located on
the former Red Lake Indian Reservation. 366 Prior to 1889, the
Reservation had been occupied by the Chippewa Indians. 367 The
Chippewa Indians agreed to convey most of the Reservation back to the
United States in 1889 so that the land could be opened to settlement by
homesteaders.368 In return, the federal government agreed to place the
proceeds of all land sales in trust for the benefit of the Chippewas.369
Congress authorized Mud Lake to be drained in accordance with state
drainage laws and the drainage project was completed in 1912.370 The
United States claimed ownership of the lakebed and planned to sell it
for the benefit of the Chippewas.371 The defendants, whose title derived
from the homestead patents, contended that as litoral owners they
owned portions of the lakebed adjacent to their upland property under
state law.372 The United States contended that Mud Lake was not
navigable and, therefore, it acquired title to the lakebed from the
Chippewas in 1889. 373 The litoral owners, on the other hand,
359 Id.
360 Id. at 86.
361 Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co., 260 U.S. at 86.
362 Id. at 87
363 Id. at 89.
364 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
365 Id. at 52-53.
366 Id. at 52.
367 Id.
368 Id.
369 Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 52.
370 Id. at 53.
371 Id. at 52.
372 Id. at 54.
373 Id.
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maintained that Mud Lake had been navigable at the time of statehood
and that they succeeded to the State of Minnesota's title when the lake
was drained.34 The federal district court ruled in favor of the defendant
landowners and this decision was affirmed on appeal, effectively
determining that Mud Lake was navigable.375
On appeal, the Supreme Court began by declaring that navigability
for title purposes was a matter of federal, not state, law.376 The Court
also reiterated the principle that "streams and lakes which are navigable-
in-fact must be regarded as navigable in law" and that streams and lakes
are considered to be navigable-in-fact "when they are used, or are
susceptible of being used, in their natural and ordinary condition, as
highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be
conducted in the customary modes of travel on water. 377 With this test
in mind, the Court observed that before it was drained, Mud Lake was
three to six feet deep. 378 Because much of the area was swampy, early
visitors and settlers found it convenient to use the lake as a means of
traveling from one point to another instead of going by land. 379 The
Mud River passed through the lake and flowed into the Thief River and
ultimately to the Red River and Canada.38 ° In light of this evidence, the
Court agreed that Mud Lake had been navigable when Minnesota was
admitted to the Union.3 81 Furthermore, there was no evidence that the
United States intended to convey the beds beneath Mud Lake, or any
other body of navigable water, when it set aside land for the Chippewa
Indians prior to statehood.38 2 Consequently, the Court confirmed title in
the defendant landowners.383
United States v. Utah384 involved a suit by the United States to quiet
title to portions of the beds of certain rivers in Utah.3 85 The rivers in
question were the Green River, which flowed in a southwesterly
direction from northern Wyoming and Colorado into the Colorado
River, the Colorado River itself, which originated in Colorado and
flowed southeast into Arizona, and the San Juan River, which flowed
westward from New Mexico to the Colorado River in southeastern
374 Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 54.
375 Id. at 54-55.
376 Id. at 55-56.
377 Id. at 56.
378 Id.
379 Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 57.
380 Id.
381 Id. at 57.
382 Id. at 58-59.
383 Id. at 59.
384 283 U.S. 64 (1931).
385 Id. at 71.
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Utah.386 Prior to 1921, that part of the Colorado River above its junction
with the Green River was known as the Grand River.387 The United
States claimed that portions of these rivers were not navigable and,
therefore, their beds were ceded to it by Mexico in 1848 by the Treaty
of Guadalupe-Hidalgo.388 The State of Utah maintained that the rivers
were navigable and that it had acquired title to their beds in 1896 when
Utah became a state.389
The Supreme Court appointed a special master to take evidence and
compile a report.3 9 The master concluded that about ninety-five miles
along the Green River were navigable; about seventy-nine miles of the
Grand River were navigable; and about 150 miles of the Colorado River
within the boundaries of Utah were navigable.39' On the other hand, the
master found about forty miles of the Colorado River south of the
confluence between the Grand River and the Green River were not
navigable and also concluded that the San Juan River was not navigable
above its confluence with the Colorado River.3 92 Both parties objected
to some of the special master's findings with respect to the status of the
Green, Grand, and Colorado Rivers.3 93
The' Court prefaced its analysis of the navigability issue by pointing
out that "[t]he question of navigability is thus determinative of the
controversy, and that is a federal question." "I The Court then
considered the navigability of the three rivers under the navigability-in-
fact test. The Court observed that the Green River above the area in
question fell 2000 feet in 387 miles, causing "many difficult and
dangerous rapids. '395 However, beginning at the junction with the San
Juan River to the junction between the Green and the Grand Rivers, the
slope was much more gradual and the river averaged about three feet in
depth. 396
The Grand River fell about 560 feet over a ninety-four-mile stretch
between Grand Junction, Colorado and to Castle Creek, Utah, where the
section in controversy began. 397 Although the river flowed through
steep canyons, the fall became pronounced after that point and there was
386 Id. at 77.
387 Id. at 73.
388 Id. at 71-72.
389 United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 72.
390 Id. at 72-73.
391 Id. at 73-74.
392 Id. at 74.
393 Id. at 74-75.
394 United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 75.
395 Id. at 77.
396 Id. at 77-78.
397 Id. at 78.
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evidence that this portion of the river had been used to transport lumber
rafts and other craft .398 The Colorado River flowed for about 190 miles
from the confluence of the Grand and Green Rivers to the Arizona-Utah
border.3 99 The special master found that the river was non-navigable
from the junction of these two rivers down to the end of Cataract
Canyon.4"0 Through this canyon, the river dropped about eleven feet per
mile through a series of "high and dangerous rapids."4 1
The United States based its claim that the rivers were non-navigable
largely on the fact that there was very little historical evidence of
navigation by Indians, fur traders, or early explorers.40 2 However, the
special master pointed out that the rivers had been used by various
watercraft, "including row-boats, flat-boats, steam-boats, motor-boats, a
barge and scows," for exploration, recreation, and for transporting
passengers and supplies in connection with prospecting, surveying, and
mining operations.4 3 All of these uses suggested that the rivers had the
potential to be used for commercial navigation.4" In other words, the
potential of the river or stream for future commercial use was relevant
to the question of navigability.4 5
Finally, the Court considered whether various impediments could
prevent a river from being navigable. These impediments included
debris, ice, floods, low flow, rapids, and sandbars.406 The Court noted
that the special master had determined that the rivers carried a
considerable amount of logs, driftwood, and other debris during floods
and other periods of high water.40 7 However, these conditions did not
seriously impair navigation.4 8 Ice was also not a serious obstacle to
navigation because periods of ice were shorter than in many navigable
rivers in the Northeast.40 9 Floods and periods of high flow did occur as
the result of snowmelt in the surrounding mountains, but the special
master found them also to be of relatively short duration.410 The special
master acknowledged that there were rapids on portions of the Grand
and Colorado Rivers, but concluded that they were not significant
398 Id. at 78-79.
399 United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 79.
400 Id.
401 Id. at 79-80.
402 Id. at 81.
403 Id. at 82.
404 United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 82.
405 Id. at 83.
406 Id. at 84-87.
407 Id. at 84.
408 Id.
409 United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 84.
410 Id.
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enough to impede navigation by properly designed motorboats. "'
Furthermore, the special master determined that none of these rapids
required portage of either boats or cargo.4" 2 Finally, the special master
acknowledged that there were shoals and sandbars in all of the rivers
and that they could be hazardous to navigation.4"3 However, the Court
cited its opinion in The Montello for the proposition that a river can be
navigable-in-fact even though "its navigation may be encompassed with
difficulties by reason of natural barriers, such as rapids and sand-
bars."4  Accordingly, the Court concluded that disputed portions of the
three rivers were navigable.4 5
In Utah v. United States, 416 the Court held that Daniel Ball's
navigability-in-fact test applied to lakes as well as rivers and streams.41 7
Utah and the United States both claimed title to certain shorelands
around the Great Salt Lake.418 Utah maintained that the lake was
navigable and, therefore, it had acquired title to the lakebed from the
United States at the time of statehood.419 The Court appointed a special
master to consider the issue of navigability and he concluded that the
lake was indeed navigable.42° In its review of the special master's
findings, the Court reaffirmed the applicability of the Daniel Ball test of
navigability for title purposes and surveyed the history of navigation on
the lake before and after statehood. In doing so, the Court
.acknowledged that due to lack of settlement in the area at that time,
evidence of commercial navigation was not extensive.42" ' However,
local ranchers used boats and barges to transport livestock to and from
islands in the lake.422 In addition, a boat known as the City of Corinne
transported passengers and freight around the lake from 1871 until
1881.423 Another boat transported salt from various salt works along the
lake to a railroad terminus.424
Even though the evidence indicated that navigation was sporadic and
minimal during this period, the Court agreed with the special master that
411 Id. at 84-85.
412 Id. at 85.
413 Id.
414 United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 86-87 (quoting from The Montello, 87 U.S. 430, 443
(1874)).
415 Id. at 89.
416 403 U.S. 9 (1971).
417 Id. at 11.
418 Id. at 9.
419 Id. at 9-10.
420 Id. at 10.
421 Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. at II.
422 Id.
423 Id. at 11-12.
424 Id. at 12.
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it was sufficient to show that "the Lake was physically capable of being
used in its ordinary condition as a highway for floating and affording
passage to water craft in the manner over which trade and travel was or
might be conducted in the customary modes of travel on water at that
time. 425 Consequently, the Court approved a decree in Utah's favor
proposed by the special master.4 6
Finally, there are also several opinions on the subject by federal
courts of appeals that are worth considering. One of these cases,
Oregon v. Riverfront Protection Association, 427 involved the
navigability of the McKenzie River, a tributary of the Willamette River
in Oregon.428 In this case, the State of Oregon brought suit to determine
the navigability of a portion of the McKenzie River. 429 Oregon
maintained that the river was navigable and that it owned the riverbed;
the defendants were riparian owners who claimed ownership to the
thread of the stream by virtue of patents from the federal government.43
The trial court ruled that the river was not navigable, but this holding
was reversed on appeal.43'
Oregon sought to prove that the river was navigable at the time of
statehood by showing that it was used to transport logs during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 43 2 One issue that the court
addressed was whether a river could still be considered navigable if
commercial navigation was difficult.433 The court concluded that the
river was susceptible to commercial use by the logging industry even
though it took logging crews thirty to fifty days, and sometimes much
longer, to complete a log drive down the thirty-two-mile stretch of river
in question. The logs required constant attention and logjams
sometimes had to be broken up with dynamite.435 In addition, excessive
rainfall caused flooding, while too little rainfall exposed gravel bars,
boulders, and shoals.436 However, despite these obstacles, thousands of
logs were driven down the river during this period. 437 The court also
observed that the seasonal nature of the log drives did not affect the
425 Id.
426 Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. at 12-13.
427 672 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1982).
428 Id. at 793.
429 Id.
430 Id. at 793-94.
431 Id. at 793.
432 Oregon v. Riverfront Prot. Ass 'n, 672 F.2d at 795-96.
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river's navigability. The log drives were not "occasional," as in the Rio
Grande Dam case, but occurred on a regular basis between April and
June over a seventeen-year period.438 Finally, the court rejected the
claim that temporary measures taken by the loggers, such as the
construction of crude "wing dams," altered the ordinary and natural
condition of the river.439 Instead, it determined that these measures may
have "facilitated the transport of logs on the McKenzie, but they did not
improve the river. '440 Consequently, the court concluded that the river
was navigable in its natural and ordinary condition at the time of
statehood."
In Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc.,442 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that evidence of recreational use could be used to prove that a river was
navigable-in-fact for commercial purposes." 3 In that case, the State of
Alaska challenged a decision by the Bureau of Land Management
("BLM") to convey a thirty-mile portion of the bed of the Gulkana
River to Ahtna, Inc., a Native American regional corporation, pursuant
to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.4 4 Alaska claimed that the
river was navigable and, therefore, belonged to the state under the equal
footing doctrine. 45 The federal district court ruled that the river was
navigable and that BLM's conveyance was invalid.446
The Gulkana River originated near Paxton, Alaska and flowed
southward through tundra, spruce forests, and lakes to the Copper River,
which in turn emptied into the Gulf of Alaska.47 As early as the 1940s,
hunters and fishermen traveled along the river in sixteen- to twenty-
four-foot fiberglass and aluminum boats, which had the capacity to
carry approximately 1000 pounds."18 In the 1970s, an industry emerged
in the area to provide guided fishing and sightseeing tours along the
river, using aluminum powerboats and inflatable rafts." 9 According to




439 Id. at 795-96.
440 Id. at 796. -
441 Id.
442 891 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1989).
443 Id. at 1405.
"4 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629 (2000).
445 Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d at 1403.
446 See Alaska v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 455, 467-68 (D. Alaska 1987).
447 Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d at 1402.
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Several questions were raised on appeal. The first was whether the
Daniel Ball test required evidence of actual commercial use on a river at
the time of statehood in order to prove navigability. The appeals court
confirmed that under that test, a river must be susceptible of commercial
use at the time of statehood, but that evidence of actual use, while
highly probative, was not required to satisfy the Daniel Ball test.45" ' In
addition, the court declared that a river's use "need not be without
difficulty, extensive, or long and continuous" for a river to be
considered navigable-in-fact. 52 Furthermore, the court concluded that it
did not matter that the river had almost exclusively been used for
recreational purposes.45 3 First of all, evidence of recreational uses could
be used to prove a river's susceptibility for commerce.454 Secondly, the
court agreed that the recreational uses could be deemed commercial in
nature when commercial enterprises developed along the river to
provide services and equipment to recreational users.455 Finally, the
court rejected the claim that the United States had reserved the beds of
navigable portions of the lower Gulkana River for itself prior to
statehood.456 For these reasons, the court held that title to the riverbed
passed to Alaska when it achieved statehood.457
It can be seen from the foregoing discussion that the rules for
determining title to submerged lands are complex. After more than 150
years of decisions by the United States Supreme Court, several
principles have emerged. First, when the original thirteen states became
independent, they succeeded to the interests of the English Crown,
including ownership of tidelands and other submerged lands. 58 Second,
under the equal footing doctrine, when territories attained statehood,
they acquired title to tidelands 459 and the beds beneath navigable rivers
and lakes 460 within their borders. Submerged lands beneath non-
navigable waters continued to be owned by the federal government or
its successors in interest. 6 '
451 Id. at 1404.
452 Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d. at 1404.
453 Id. at 1405.
454 Id.
455 Id.
456 Id. at 1405-06.
457 Alaska v. Ahlna, Inc., 891 F.2d at 1406.
458 See Martin v. Wadell, 41 U.S. 367, 416 (1842).
459 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 484-85 (1988); Mann v. Tacoma
Land Co., 153 U.S. 273, 284-85 (1894); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894); Pollard v.
Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 222-23 (1845).
460 See Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 12 (1971); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270
U.S. 9, 54-55 (1926); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876).
461 See Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 89 (1922); Oklahoma v.
Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 591-92 (1922).
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The Supreme Court has emphasized that navigability for title
purposes is determined by federal law, not state law.462 The Court has
traditionally relied on the Daniel Ball "navigability-in-fact" test to
determine the navigability of non-tidal waters for title purposes.4 63
However, the version of this test that is used for title purposes differs in
some respects from the version typically used to determine the scope of
federal admiralty or Commerce Clause regulation. For example,
although the river or lake does not have to actually been used for "trade
or travel,464 it must be susceptible of such use in its natural condition.65
Therefore, artificial improvements that subsequently transform a non-
navigable river or lake into a navigable one will not affect ownership of
the bed. This contrasts with the Court's approach in other cases, where
rivers and streams may be treated as navigable for regulatory purposes
if they can be made navigable with reasonable improvements. 466
Another requirement is that the river or lake must be capable of use for
commercial navigation. However, this commercial use does not have to
occur year round; it can be seasonal in nature.467 In addition, the fact
that commercial navigation is difficult because of rapids, sand bars, and
other impediments does not preclude a river from being considered
navigable under the Daniel Ball test. 468 Finally, ownership is
determined as of the date of statehood. Changes in the condition of the
river or lake after that time do not have any effect on the state of the
title. 69 Finally, rivers and streams may be navigable in some sections
but not in others.47 In those portions of a river that are navigable, the
states would own the beds under the equal footing principle. "'
However, the United States or its successors-in-interest would own the
beds beneath the non-navigable portions.472
462 See Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10-11 (1971); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64,
75-76 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1926).
463 See, e.g., United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 76 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank,
270 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1926); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v: United States, 260 U.S. 87, 89
(1922).
464 See Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1971); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 82
(1931).
465 See Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 591 (1922).
466 See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407 (1940).
467 See Oregon v. Riverfront Prot. Ass'n, 672 F.2d 792, 795 (9th Cir. 1982).
468 See United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 86-87 (1931).
469 See United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1926).
470 See United v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 72-74.
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The Supreme Court and the PPL Montana Case
V. THE PPL MONTANA CONTROVERSY
PPL Montana v. Montana473 represents the most recent attempt by the
United States Supreme Court to clarify the issue of navigability for title.
Finding in favor of the private landowner, the Court rejected the
expansive test of navigability proposed by the State of Montana and
reaffirmed that navigability for title purposes should be determined on a
segment-by-segment basis.
A. Facts and Procedural History
PPL Montana owns and operates ten dams/hydroelectric power plants
on the Missouri, Madison, and Clark Fork rivers.474 Five of these
facilities are located along the Great Falls Reach of the Upper Missouri
River and two other power plants have been constructed upstream on
the Stubbs Ferry area of that river.475 The power company also operates
two additional hydroelectric plants on the Madison River.476 These nine
facilities are known collectively as the Missouri-Madison Project.477 In
addition, PPL Montana maintains a power plant on the Thompson Falls
area of the Clark Fork River.478 This facility is called the Thompson
Falls Project.479
PPL's hydroelectric power plants were all located in the beds of what
were thought to be non-navigable rivers.4"' PPL or its predecessor, the
Montana Power Company, had maintained facilities on these riverbeds
for many years, and in some cases, for over a century.48' Throughout
this period, PPL leased these beds from their apparent owner, the United
States government, and various state agencies participated in federal
licensing proceedings in connection with the Missouri-Madison and
Thompson Falls Projects. 482
As mentioned earlier, the power plants in question are located on
three different rivers: the Missouri, the Madison, and the Clark Fork.
The Missouri and Madison Rivers are on the eastern side of the
Continental Divide, while the Clark Fork River is on the western side.
The Madison River joins with the Jefferson and Gallatin Rivers at Three
Forks, Montana to form the Upper Missouri River. The Missouri flows
473 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012).










214 Virginia Environmental Law Journal [Vol. 31:168
through seven states before reaching the Mississippi River just north of
St. Louis. The Clark River empties into the Columbia River system
which flows into the Pacific Ocean.
The dispute over ownership of the riverbeds began in 2003, when the
parents of some Montana schoolchildren brought suit in federal court
against PPL Montana, alleging that its hydroelectric plants were located
on school trust lands.483 The State of Montana eventually joined the
suit, but it was ultimately dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction in 2005. 44 Shortly thereafter, PPL Montana filed a
declaratory action in state court seeking to prevent the State from
demanding compensation for the power company's use of the beds.485
In response, Montana filed a counterclaim contending that it owned the
riverbeds in question and could charge the power companies rent for the
use of the beds. 486 Concluding that the rivers in question were
navigable, the trial court granted summary judgment in the State's favor
and ruled that PPL Montana must pay the State almost $41 million for
use of the riverbeds between 2001 and 2007.487 The lower court's
decision on the navigability issue was affirmed on appeal by the
Montana Supreme Court.488
B. The Montana Supreme Court's Decision
The principal issue before the Montana Supreme Court was whether
the lower court erred in granting the state's motion for summary
judgment. However, the appellate court resolved to discuss the
following substantive issues as well: (1) the proper test to determine
navigability for purposes of title; (2) whether the submerged lands
occupied by PPL Montana were school trust lands; (3) whether use of
these submerged lands was included in the right to appropriate water for
a beneficial use; (4) whether PPL Montana could raise any affirmative
defenses; (5) whether the Hydroelectric Resources Act ("HRA") applied
to the Thompson Falls and Madison-Missouri Projects; and (6) whether
the lower court calculated the damages owed by PPL Montana
correctly.48 9
The Montana court decided the second issue in favor of PPL
Montana, holding that submerged beds beneath navigable waters were
483 See PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 229 P.3d 421, 426 (Mont. 2010).
484 Id. at 427.
485 Id.
486 Id. at 428.
487 Id. at 443.
488 PPL Montana, LLC, 229 P.3d at 461.
489 Id. at 443.
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not school trust lands. However, the court then concluded that the beds
were subject to the public trust doctrine. As such, they could not be
transferred into private ownership except pursuant to general legislation
or upon payment of full market value to the state. The court ruled in the
state's favor on the remaining issues. For example, the court rejected
PPL Montana's claim that the right to appropriate water to produce
hydroelectric power carried with it an incidental right to use state land
for this purpose.490 The court also held that the state's claim to
compensation for the power company's use of public trust lands was not
barred by the statute of limitations applicable to private landowners.49'
In addition, the court determined that the state Hydroelectric Resources
Act, which governed leases of state-owned lands, was not preempted by
the Federal Power Act.492 Finally, the Montana court gave its approval
to the methodology by which the lower court calculated the
compensation to which the state was entitled from PPL Montana for the
use of state lands from 2000 to 2007. 493
However, the most important issue before the Montana court was that
of navigability. First, the court concluded that it was proper for two of
the state's expert witnesses to rely on historical works, newspapers, and
periodicals to support their conclusion that the rivers in question had
been navigable at the time of statehood.494 The court observed that all
of these sources would not be excluded at trial under the hearsay rule,
but rather would be admissible as self-authenticating documents. 495 It
also noted that other courts had allowed the parties to rely upon
historical sources to determine navigability for title when evidence of
navigability was based on events or conditions that occurred in the
distant past.496
The court also considered whether the lower court had applied the
correct test of navigability to determine title.497 The Montana Supreme
Court observed that the lower court had allowed evidence of present-
day usage to prove that a river was susceptible at the time of statehood
of being used in the future as a channel for commerce.498 In addition,
the lower court had ruled that a river could be navigable even though
490 Id. at 450-51.
491 Id. at 451-52.
492 Id. at 452-54.
493 PPL Montana, LLC, 229 P.3d at 454-61.
494 Id. at 445-46.
495 Id.
496 Id. at 446 (citing Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 557 F.2d 349, 354-46
(2d Cir. 1977)); Montana Power, 185 F.2d at 498.
497 PPL Montana, LLC, 229 P.3d at 446.
498 Id.
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portages were necessary to circumvent falls, rapids, or other
obstructions.49 9 The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
version of the test of navigability for title."' 0 Quoting from United
States v. Utah5"' and The Montello,50 2 the Montana Supreme Court
declared that the concept of navigability for title purposes had been
liberally construed by the United States Supreme Court. 03 Thus, the
court held that to be navigable, a river does not have to be actually used
for navigation at the time of statehood as long as is susceptible of
supporting commerce. 0 4 Furthermore, relying on language from The
Montello, the court declared that the existence of portages and other
obstructions would not preclude a finding of navigability. 505 Finally, the
court stated that when considering whether a river is susceptible of
acting as a "channel for commerce," the Supreme Court had construed
commerce very broadly.50 6 In particular, the court determined that
"emerging or newly-discovered forms of commerce" can be applied
retroactively to determine navigability.50 7 For this reason, it concluded
that present-day usage of a river could be relevant to whether it was
navigable at the time of statehood. 8
The court rejected PPL Montana's claim that the lower court erred in
granting summary judgment to the state because there were genuine
issues of material fact on the issue of navigability with respect to each
of the rivers in question. 509 In addition, the court rejected PPL
Montana's claim that the rivers were not navigable because of the
existence of obstructions.5"0 In the case of the Missouri River, the
Montana court declared that falls and rapids along the river did not
prevent the Lewis and Clark expedition from traversing it by means of
portage when necessary.5" In the case of the Clark Fork and Madison
Rivers, the court discounted the findings of PPL Montana's experts
because they were based on "conclusory" statements contained in a
federal district court decree and a report by the United States Corps of
499 Id.
500 Id.
501 283 U.S. 64 (1931).
502 87 U.S. 430 (1870).
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Engineers.512 According to the court, there was no factual support for
the conclusions reached in these documents." 3 The court also rejected
the conclusion of another expert witness that dams constructed on the
Madison River since statehood had enhanced its navigability, declaring
instead that evidence of present-day recreational uses on the river was
sufficient to establish that it was susceptible for use as a channel of
commerce at the time of statehood." 4
Finally, the Montana court rejected PPL Montana's argument that an
entire river could not be classified as navigable for title purposes if
particular stretches of it were non-navigable due to its physical
characteristics. 515 The court acknowledged that the United States
Supreme Court had considered the navigability of certain sections of a
river as opposed to the river as a whole."1 6 However, the court declared
that the Court had confined this approach to "long reaches" of the river
whose navigability was at issue. 17
C. The United States Supreme Court's Opinion
PPL Montana appealed to the United States Supreme Court and the
Court granted certiorari in 2011. 511 After hearing oral arguments in
October, 2011, the Court issued an opinion in February, 2012,
unanimously reversing the judgment of the Montana Supreme Court. 19
The Court reviewed the English ebb and flow test of navigability for
title purposes and its eventual displacement in the United States by the
Daniel Ball navigability-in-fact approach. 2° The Court also discussed
the equal footing doctrine and the difference between the tests of
navigability for title purposes and the test for purposes of determining
the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.5 21
One of the first issues before the Court involved the effect of non-
navigable segments and overland portage on a river's navigability for
title purposes. The Montana Supreme Court had concluded that long
stretches of a river could be classified as navigable even though portions
of it were non-navigable because of shoals, sandbars, or rapids. 2
512 Id.
513 PPL Montana, 229 P.3d at 448.
514 Id.
515 Id. at 449.
516 Id. at 448.
517 Id. (quoting United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 77).
518 131 S. Ct. 3019 (2011).
519 See PPL Montana, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1222 (2012).
520 Id. at 1226-27.
521 Id. at 1228-29.
522 See PPL Montana, 229 P.3d at 449.
